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SEPARATING THE WHEAT FROM THE TARES: THE SUPREME 
COURT’S PREMATURE STRICT SCRUTINY OF RACE-BASED 
REMEDIAL MEASURES IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As I frequented the ironically named Martin Luther 
King, Jr. Boulevard through the eastern portion of Lubbock, 
Texas, during my time living in the area from 2010-2012, I 
found this major thoroughfare to be a physical separator of 
Lubbock’s Black residents from the rest of the city.1 This street 
became a tangible marker of the continued housing patterns 
caused by decades of legalized segregation among Lubbock’s 
residents. I also found the city’s Latino residents to be heavily 
segregated from many of the Black and White residents (who 
were concentrated in the nicer southwestern part of Lubbock), 
and remarked that there could be such a sharp tri-racial division 
in any American town decades after the Civil Rights movement 
in the 1960s and 1970s.2  
In this article, I provide some historical context to Lub-
bock’s de facto segregation patterns and use Lubbock’s history 
as a microcosm to illustrate the failure of the desegregation 
movement in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s to 
create a long-term desegregation in public schools. I then seek 
to demonstrate that it is socially damaging when American ju-
rists ascribe to the myth of post-racialism.  
 
 1.  See LLOYD POTTER, OFFICE OF THE STATE DEMOGRAPHER, TEXAS AND 
LUBBOCK: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS (2011), http://txsdc.utsa.edu/ 
Resources/Presentations/OSD/2011/2011_12_13_Lubbock_Chamber_of_Commerce.pdf. 
 2.  Race and Ethnicity in Lubbock, Texas, STATISTICAL ATLAS (Sept. 12, 2018), 
https://statisticalatlas.com/place/Texas/Lubbock/Race-and-Ethnicity; Potter, supra note 1. 
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This article is not intended as a comprehensive evalua-
tion of the history of racism in the United States, affirmative 
action, or other remedial measures. Rather, I briefly discuss the 
complex relationship between race and the law in public educa-
tion, and why American jurisprudence should continue to allow 
race-based remedial measures.  
In this paper,  I attempt to do the following: (I) briefly 
describe the history of de jure segregation in Lubbock schools, 
as an illustrative example of the complexities of race in the U.S. 
education system; (II) describe why the concept of “post-
racialism” society is a harmful myth that distracts American ju-
rists from allowing race-based remedial measures to counter 
continued damage both from past de jure segregation and con-
tinued de facto segregation; (III) describe the need for contin-
ued use of race-based remedial measures to establish “true” in-
tegration and diversity in the American public education 
system.3 
 
II. LUBBOCK TEXAS: A CASE STUDY FOR THE NATION   
 
There is significant damage done to a city’s school sys-
tem when cities take on a post-racial mindset while racism re-
mains an significant issue in the community. This occurs when 
cities in the U.S. seek to focus on the future “after” racism, 
without actually eliminating, both “root and branch,” the legal, 
political, and social effects of centuries of racist laws.4 Jurists 
have a duty as guardians of the Constitution, with a duty to 
 
 3.  See “true” integration and diversity defined infra, Section III. 
 4.  Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968) (“We bear in mind that 
the court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible 
eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future.”); 
see also MARGUERITE L. SPENCER, ET AL, THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION IN OUR EDUCATION SYSTEM: WHY THIS MATTERS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY, 
6-11 (Kirwan Inst. for the Study of Race and Ethnicity: Ohio State Univ. 2009) (discussing the 
damage caused by de facto racial and socioeconomic segregation). 
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protect society from both overtly racist laws as well as law 
which undermine racial and ethnic minority groups through 
indirect disparate impact.  
The situation of Lubbock, Texas provides an illustrative 
case study for the damage done when cities make such a prema-
ture jump to post-racialist mindset before actually eliminating 
the effects of racism.  
 
A. Residential Segregation and Education in Lubbock 
 
In 2006, the Lubbock City Council discovered that City 
Ordinance 225, which imposed race-based housing segregation, 
was still technically part of the city’s code.5 Ordinance 225 was 
passed by the city council in 1923, and imposed a fine up to 
$200 (the equivalent of $2,917.44 in 2018) for any Black resi-
dent of Lubbock who tried to live anywhere outside of the 
southeastern quadrant of Lubbock.6 The 1923 city council’s 
reasoning for Ordinance 225 was laid out in no uncertain 
terms. The ordinance stated that the “residence [of Blacks] is 
dangerous to the health and pollutes the earth and atmos-
phere.”7 The city council’s blatantly racist reasoning is a mere 
snapshot of the social, political, and legal rhetoric that was writ-
ten into city and state law throughout the United States during 
the Jim Crow era, which included the segregation of such plac-
es as parks, cemeteries, theaters, and restaurants.8 While Ordi-
 
 5.  City Council Repeals Segregation Ordinance, KCBD NEWS CHANNEL 11 
LUBBOCK, April 26, 2006, http://www.kcbd.com/story/4823976/city-council-repeals-
segregation-ordinance; Council to Get Rid of 83-Year-Old Ordinance Defining Segregation, 
KCBD NEWS CHANNEL 11 LUBBOCK, April 25, 2006, http://www.kcbd.com/story/4818279/ 
council-to-get-rid-of-83-year-old-ordinance-defining-segregation/. 
 6.  Calculate the value of $200 in 1923, DOLLAR TIMES, https://www.dollartimes.com/ 
inflation/inflation.php?amount=200&year=1923 (last visited April 19, 2018); Council to Get 
Rid of 83-Year-Old Ordinance, supra note 5. 
 7.  Council to Get Rid of 83-Year-Old Ordinance, supra note 5. 
 8.  Melvin I. Urofsky, Jim Crow Law, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (August 20, 2018), 
/https://www.britannica.com/event/Jim-Crow-law. 
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nance 225 had not been enforced for decades, the presence of 
the ordinance in the archives of the city’s code as recently as 
2006 indicates that Lubbock had not carefully sought to rid it-
self of even overt, albeit unenforced, racism in its communi-
ties.9 As one legal scholar stated: “Post-racialism does not chal-
lenge this indifference, this sense that we are not responsible 
for or capable of remedying racial injustice. It rather reassures 
us there is no injustice there to be remedied. Surely such expia-
tion can only delay racial justice.”10 Thus, despite the recogni-
tion of continued racial inequities and racial segregation by 
scholars and informed leaders in the country, leaders in Lub-
bock and too many leaders throughout the nation seem to con-
tinue to ignore and perhaps in some instances even perpetuate 
the myth of post-racialism.11  
Perhaps even more concerning than the presence of an 
unenforced racist law in Lubbock is the euphemistic rhetoric 
surrounding the discovery of Ordinance 225. The author of the 
article reporting the discovery of Ordinance 225 states that 
“[y]ou can find signs of unity and integration across Lubbock 
today. However, a part of Lubbock’s past many would like to 
forget is resurfacing. . . . [t]he nation has made great strides in 
the civil rights movement since 1923.”12 This language spurs 
the question: why are leaders in Lubbock, and throughout the 
nation, seeking to forget the racist past? Should not this awful, 
but true, part of the nation’s history be remembered to avoid 
 
 9.  See e.g., Patrick McGrain, The Myth of Post-racial America, WHYY (February 24, 
2018), https://whyy.org/articles/myth-post-racial-america/; Michael C. Dawson & Lawrence 
D. Bobo, One Year Later and the Myth of a Post-Racial Society, 6 DU BOIS REVIEW: SOCIAL 
SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RACE, no. 2, 247–249 (2009), https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/ 
10347165; Ian F. Haney López, Is the “Post” in Post-Racial the “Blind” in Colorblind?, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 830-31 (2011). 
 10.  López, supra note 9, at 831. 
 11.  See e.g., McGrain, supra note 9; Dawson & Bobo, supra note 9; López, supra note 
9, at 830-31. 
 11.  López, supra note 9, at 831. 
 12.  Council to Get Rid of 83-Year-Old Ordinance, supra note 5 (emphasis added). 
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ever allowing legally sanctioned prejudice to exist in the United 
States again? Should not, then, the nation’s racist history serve 
as a motivator to remove de facto racism and bigotry? The illu-
sion of moving beyond racism is not only unhelpful but is actu-
ally harmful in the sense that it leads the American public to 
falsely believe that there is not more work that needs to be done 
in establishing racial equality.13 
The article titled “Council To Get Rid of 83-Year-Old 
Ordinance Defining Segregation” provides the common rheto-
ric of post-racialists—that Lubbock has progressed since the 
civil rights movement—by citing the fact that the city has a ma-
jor road named after civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. 
What the author fails to mention is that Lubbock’s MLK 
Boulevard ironically follows the very border that was used to 
segregate Lubbock’s Black residents for so many years.14 The 
article betrays the author’s ignorance, which they share with 
many other post-racialists, that may lead a reader to conclude 
that the mere fact of a city memorializing a civil rights leader 
on a street sign or a school equates to the city (and impliedly 
the entire nation where streets and landmarks throughout it at 
named after civil rights leaders) making “great strides” in com-
bating racism and repairing the damage done by legally institu-
tionalized racism.15   
This ignorance extends to government leaders, as was 
apparent in a local Lubbock news article, where the author pro-
vided a quotation from two members of the 2006 Lubbock City 
Council. One councilmember stated that “[t]here are a lot of 
things in our past that none of us are proud of and we hope 
those get rectified and things get better as we move along as a 
 
 13.  See e.g., McGrain, supra note 9; Dawson & Bobo, supra note 9; López, supra note 
9, at 830-31. 
 14.  Council to Get Rid of 83-Year-Old Ordinance, supra note 5. 
 15.  Id. 
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country, as a state, and also as a city.”16 Another councilmember 
stated that “[w]e don’t need anything like [Ordinance 225] on 
the books of Lubbock where people can go back and research 
and say this that and the other. We need to move forward, not 
stay back where we were in 1923.”17 While it is true that gov-
ernment leaders cannot merely refer to the past to improve the 
laws of the future, leaders should not ignore U.S. history in 
making legal and policy determinations. The nation’s history 
contains vital context that government leaders must heed if they 
are to avoid the mistakes of past generations and make the right 
decisions moving forward. 
While it is troubling, in and of itself, that it took close to 
a century for the Lubbock City Council to specifically remove 
Ordinance 225 from its record books, it is symbolic of an even 
larger issue: many political leaders and the electorate of the 
United States appear to ascribe to the claim that the U.S. is 
now in a “post-racial” period, without addressing the continued 
consequences of past centuries of de jure segregation and cur-
rent de facto racism. One sociology and critical race theory 
scholar has explained the dichotomy between post-racial rheto-
ric used in public discourse (especially in the wake of President 
Obama’s election and reelection as the first “Black” president) 
and the continued consequences of racism: 
 
Society appears to be experiencing confu-
sion about the continued existence of racism. 
This confusion stems from the existence of clear 
inequalities in social outcomes, on one hand, and 
the election of an African American to the White 
House, on the other. Obama’s own rhetoric has 
blinded Americans to the realities of continuing 
 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
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racial inequities. Using a CRT narrative, we can 
juxtapose Obama’s rhetoric with reality and con-
clude that we are not, in fact, in a post-racial pe-
riod. 
As our research demonstrates, Americans 
are confronted with two sides of a dichotomy: the 
promise of a post-racial narrative as well as the 
permanence of racism. Our participants revealed 
the emotional power contained in the post-racial 
narrative: Americans want to believe we are in a 
post-racial period, even to the exclusion of evi-
dence of the contrary. On a larger scale, believing 
that we have entered a post-racial period may re-
sult in a lack of attention to the very real prod-
ucts of continued, systemic racism in society. 
These products include inequities in educational 
outcomes, incarceration rates, employment pat-
terns, health care, housing availability and quali-
ty, and racial profiling.18 
 
Consequently, political leaders in the United States and 
many of their constituents, continue to keep themselves igno-
rant of the ongoing consequences of past de jure racism and 
current de facto racism. The history and current situation of de 
jure and de facto segregation in Lubbock serves as a case study 
to provide essential insight into the ongoing damage inflicted 
on society by racism and segregation. 
The harmful consequences of Lubbock’s history of le-
galized residential segregation is perhaps most apparent in the 
effect it has had on the city’s public-school system. Between 
1950 and 1977, as the population of Lubbock (especially within 
 
 18.  Bettina L. Love & Brandelyn Tosolt, Reality or Rhetoric? Barack Obama and Post-
Racial America, 17 JEAN AIT BELKHIR, RACE, GENDER & CLASS J., no. 3/4, 19, 33 (2010). 
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the White community) significantly increased, the population 
also became increasingly more divided along racial lines.19 
White flight resulted in a large movement of Whites from the 
northeast and north-central portion of Lubbock to the south-
western part of town.20 Many Black and Latino residents then 
filled the homes vacated by White tenants—creating extreme 
de facto residential segregation.21 Lubbock maintained a com-
plicated set of rules for transferring students, in order to dis-
courage integration.22 One of the primary deterrents that was 
imposed by these rules was the requirement that students desir-
ing to attend integrated schools pay the cost of transportation.23 
By 1969, the Lubbock Independent School District (LISD) was 
still significantly segregated, which led the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to require that the 
school district submit a workable desegregation plan.24 In order 
to fulfill this requirement, the LISD held open-community 
meetings to discuss integration strategies. On August 19, 1970, 
the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights 
Division filed a suit against the LISD in the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Texas, alleging that the LISD had 
maintained a segregated school system in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and ordered the LISD to desegregate.25 
Unfortunately, there were road blocks to integration as ten-
sions quickly arose between some of the students and between 
some of their parents in the newly integrated schools. Tragical-
ly, within a few months of integration, a White student shot 
 
 19.  United States v. Texas Ed. Agency, 600 F.2d 518, 520-21 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  BEHNKEN, FIGHTING THEIR OWN BATTLES: MEXICAN AMERICANS, BLACKS, 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN TEXAS, 146-47 (2011). 
 23.  See id. at 147. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  United States v. Texas Ed. Agency, 600 F.2d 518, 520 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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and killed a Black student in class.26 This event created a riot in 
which students and parents engaged in physical altercations in 
schools and shots were fired culminating in a “mass exodus” of 
both White and Latino students from the integrated schools.27 
Thus, after only a short period of integration, the LISD and 
Lubbock as a whole “resegregated as quickly as it had integrat-
ed.”28 
Despite the failure of the LISD to comply with court-
ordered desegregation, no further legal action was taken until 
the spring of 1977 when the LISD applied to the district court 
for permission to build new schools in the district.29 At that 
time, Lubbock’s student population was 59.4% White, 27.3% 
Mexican-American, and 12.6% Black.30 Despite a majority 
White population, the minority students in Lubbock were con-
fined to schools with large minority populations and with high 
poverty rates.31 The “Black schools” were segregated on every 
level of primary and secondary education in Dunbar High 
School, Struggs Junior High School, and Iles and Wheatley El-
ementary Schools.32 Meanwhile, the Guadalupe School—
previously termed the “Mexican School”—had retained the ma-
jority of Latino students.33 “The [district] court found that the 
minority status of the Guadalupe Elementary School and of the 
all-Black schools built on or near the site of the old Dunbar 
Schools (Dunbar High School, Struggs Junior High School, 
and Iles and Wheatley Elementary Schools) was the result of 
School Board action.”34 Furthermore, “[i]t found that even after 
 
 26.  BEHNKEN, supra note 22, at 212-13 n.26. 
 27.  BEHNKEN, supra note 22, at 213. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  United States v. Texas Ed. Agency, 600 F.2d 518, 520 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 30.  Id. at 521. 
 31.  Id. at 520-21. 
 32.  Id. at 521. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
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De jure segregation ended, the School Board gerrymandered 
the attendance zones for these schools to retain their minority 
population.”35  
In order to determine the extent of existing segregation 
in the LISD, the district court held an evidentiary hearing.36 Af-
ter the hearing, the district court found that only nine of the 
LISD’s twenty-two “minority schools” were caused by the 
LISD’s policies.37 Thus, the district court entered an order re-
quiring the LISD to desegregate the nine specified schools and 
allowed the LISD to build new schools subject to the district 
courts approval of the LISD’s desegregation plan for the nine 
specified minority schools.38 The DOJ appealed the district 
court’s ruling to the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals based 
on two primary arguments: (1) “the district court erred in hold-
ing that the racial composition of the minority schools not in-
cluded in the desegregation order was not the product of 
School Board action,” and (2) “the desegregation plan adopted 
by the district court unfairly burden[ed] minority students.”39 
Upon appeal, the Fifth Circuit took issue with two as-
pects of the lower court’s orders.40 The first point of disagree-
ment was the fact that the district court only required nine of 
the twenty-two schools to be desegregated, while it considered 
the remaining segregation to be the result of “racially neutral 
neighborhood school assignment plans.”41 The district court 
had incorrectly assumed that because the school boundaries 
were based on the proximity of the students’ homes to the 
schools, this was a “racially neutral” assignment.42 The Fifth 
 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 520. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 525. 
 42.  Id. 
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Circuit relied upon the important precedent of Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1970), during which 
the U.S. Supreme Court had heard a similar argument, to 
which it responded: 
 
All things being equal, with no history of dis-
crimination, it might well be desirable to assign 
pupils to schools nearest their homes. But all 
things are not equal in a system that has been de-
liberately constructed and maintained to enforce 
racial segregation. 
. . . “Racially neutral” assignment plans proposed 
by school authorities to a district court may be 
inadequate; such plans may fail to counteract the 
continuing effects of past school segregation re-
sulting from discriminatory location of school 
sites or distortion of school size in order to 
achieve or maintain an artificial racial separation. 
When school authorities present a district court 
with a “loaded game board,” affirmative action in 
the form of remedial altering of attendance zones 
is proper to achieve truly nondiscriminatory as-
signments. In short, an assignment plan is not ac-
ceptable simply because it appears to be neutral.43  
 
Thus, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that because residential 
segregation was an issue for Lubbock, school boundaries based 
on housing patterns would only work to continue the pattern of 
school segregation.44 The court provided the following reason-
ing: 
 
 43.  Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (U.S. 1971). 
 44.  Texas Ed. Agency, 600 F.2d at 521. 
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To treat a school located in an urban area as an 
isolated unit free from the effects of acts taken 
with regard to other schools in the district is un-
realistic and contrary to the policy underlying the 
progeny of Brown that the effects of intentional 
segregation be eliminated “root and branch.45 
 
The second aspect of the district court’s order that the 
Fifth Circuit found problematic was that it unjustly placed the 
burden of proof upon the plaintiffs to prove that segregation 
actually existed.46 In making this decision, the appellate court 
relied upon the precedent set by Keyes v. Denver (1973),47 
which had shifted the burden of proof from the plaintiffs to the 
Denver School District to show that discriminatory policies did 
not exist.48 With the essential precedent of Keyes, the LISD 
was not only guilty of de jure segregation but was also found 
guilty of a number of more subversive de facto segregation 
methods that led to further segregation:49 
 
The gerrymander of attendance zones and the 
building of schools of certain sizes at certain loca-
tions, against the historic backdrop of a De jure 
system of segregation of long standing, can have 
the effect of designating certain schools as minor-
ity schools and of marking the areas of the city in 
which those schools are located as minority areas.  
 
Intentional school segregation in the past may 
have been a factor in creating a natural environ-
 
 45.  Id. at 525. 
 46.  Id. at 521. 
 47.  Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
 48.  Texas Ed. Agency, 600 F.2d at 521. 
 49.  Id. at 524-25. 
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ment for growth of further segregation. Thus, if 
the respondent School Board cannot disprove 
segregative intent, it can rebut the prima facie 
case only by showing that its past segregative acts 
did not create or contribute to the current segre-
gated condition of the core city schools. 
 
We could hold that any segregative effect caused 
by an intentionally segregative act violates the 
Constitution.50 
 
Thus, it became clear that the LISD had gerrymandered at-
tendance zones across geographic boundaries, which had re-
sulted in racially segregated schools due to the de facto residen-
tial segregation that existed throughout Lubbock.51 These 
actions by the school district exacerbated segregation to the 
point that by 1978, of the 50 total schools in the district, 12 
schools had minority (Black and Latino) populations exceeding 
70%, while 19 had White populations greater than 70%.52 
Complicating the school segregation dynamic in the LISD is 
that Black and Latino students were not only desegregated 
from White students, but also from one another, thus further 
exacerbating the tri-racial divide that was occurring on the 
ground in Lubbock.53 Desegregation, then, became a complex 
matter of integrating all three groups of students into the same 
schools. Astoundingly, twenty years after the Brown decision, 
more than 60% of Lubbock’s schools maintained this extensive 
tri-racial segregation.54 
 
 50.  Id. at 527. 
 51.  Id. at 521. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 527. 
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The Fifth Circuit also identified several other indirect 
causes of segregation by the LISD, including: the use of op-
tional attendance zones for White students to attend schools 
outside of their area, the manipulation of bus routes to make in-
tegration more difficult, and the adjustment of school capacities 
to allow more White students to concentrate in certain schools 
while confining Black and Latino students into other schools.55 
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit found the district court’s “conclu-
sory statement that no [constitutional] violation had occurred at 
the minority schools unaffected by the order, the district court 
made no specific findings on the effects on the schools and on 
Lubbock’s housing patterns of the intentional segregative acts it 
found the School Board had committed.”56 Thus, the case was 
remanded to the district for further findings of fact to deter-
mine “how much ‘incremental segregative effect’ the School 
Board’s intentional discriminatory acts had on the residential 
distribution of the Lubbock school population” as “compared 
to what [the residential distribution] would have been in the ab-
sence of such intentional segregative acts.57 The Fifth Circuit 
stated held that upon remand, any “segregative effect caused by 
an intentionally segregative act” would be held to violate the 
Constitution.58 
Despite the judicial intervention in the LISD in the 
1970’s, the LISD has continued to suffer from the effects of de 
facto residential segregation. This continued de facto segrega-
tion is highlighted in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 55.  Id. at 529. 
 56.  Id. at 527. 
 57.  Id. at 527-28. 
 58.  Id. at 527. 
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B. Students in Lubbock Today 
 
The following table (Table 1) shows the demographic 
and socioeconomic makeup of (1) the Lubbock Independent 
School District’s (LISD) as a whole, (2) Lubbock High Schools, 
and (3) Lubbock Middle Schools. The bolded percentages show 
disproportionate rates of non-White and White students and 
subsequent rates of economically disadvantaged and at-risk stu-
dents. 
Table 1: Demographic Makeup of LISD 
Entity 
“African 
American” 
Population 
“Hispanic” 
Population 
“White” 
Population 
“Economically 
Disadvantaged” 
Students 
“At-risk” 
Students 59 
LISD60 13.5% 59.2% 23.2% 66.8% 45.8% 
 
Lubbock High Schools 
 
 
Coronado 
High  
School61 
12% 51.1% 32.9% 46.9% 41.9% 
Estacado 
High62  
School 
48.5% 47.3% 2.5% 89.7 % 65.5% 
Lubbock 
High 
School63 
5.6% 61.8% 24.8% 44% 33.8% 
 
 59.  About the Data, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org/about/#at-
risk (last visited February 23, 2019) (providing the Texas Education Agency’s definition of “at-
risk” students). 
 60.  Lubbock ISD, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org/districts/ 
lubbock-isd/ (last visited February 23, 2019). 
 61.  Coronado High School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org/ 
districts/lubbock-isd/coronado-high-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019). 
 62.  Estacado High School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org 
/districts/lubbock-isd/estacado-high-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019). 
 63.  Lubbock High School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org 
/districts/lubbock-isd/lubbock-high-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019). 
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Monterey 
High 
School64 
11.8% 58.6% 26.4% 54.1% 46.3% 
 
Lubbock Middle Schools 
 
 
Atkins 
Middle 
School65 
13.7% 74.4% 10.1% 81.6% 62.5% 
Cavazos 
Middle 
School66 
4.5% 91.6% 2.6% 92% 63.5% 
Dunbar 
Middle 
School67 
53.4% 43.3% 1.7% 89.3% 78.6% 
Evans  
Middle 
School68 
10.5% 47.5% 38.2% 45.6% 35.8% 
Irons  
Middle 
School69 
6.6% 38.7% 49.8% 39.7% 34.4% 
Mackenzie 
Middle 
School70 
14.3% 60.6% 21.4% 68.2% 50.8% 
 
 64.  Monterey High School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org/ 
districts/lubbock-isd/monterey-high-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019). 
 65.  Atkins Middle School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org 
/districts/lubbock-isd/atkins-middle-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019). 
 66.  Cavazos Middle School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org/ 
districts/lubbock-isd/cavazos-middle-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019). 
 67.  Dunbar Middle School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE,  https://schools.texastribune.org/ 
districts/lubbock-isd/dunbar-middle-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019). (Dunbar is some-
what of an anomaly as it was established as a historical “Black” high school, initially started to 
help black students attend college during the time of de jure racial discriminatory laws). 
 68.  Evans Middle School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org 
/districts/lubbock-isd/evans-middle-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019). 
 69.  Irons Middle School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org 
/districts/lubbock-isd/irons-middle-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019). 
 70.  Mackenzie Middle School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org/ 
districts/lubbock-isd/mackenzie-middle-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019). 
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Smylie 
Wilson 
Middle 
School71 
15% 68.6% 14.2% 89.5% 58.6% 
Slaton 
Middle 
School72 
13.3% 78.3% 6% 90.1% 70.6% 
 
Table 1 lists all of the LISD’s high schools and middle 
schools, and the percentages of “African American,” “Hispanic 
(or Latino),” and “White” students by school as compared to 
the LISD as a whole, and the percentage of “Economically Dis-
advantaged” and “At-risk” students in each school as compared 
to the LISD as a whole. The LISD has 13.5% African Ameri-
can/Black students, 59.2% Hispanic/Latino students, and 
23.2% White/Caucasian students, with 66.8% of the students 
as economically disadvantaged and 45.8% of the its students 
considered “at risk.”73 While most of Lubbock’s high schools 
have fairly proportionate demographics compared to the LISD 
as a whole, Estacado High School has disproportionately higher 
rates of non-White students (48.5% African American students 
and 47.3% Hispanic students) compared to White students 
(2.5% White students). Furthermore, Estacado High School’s 
rate of economically disadvantaged students is 89.7% and its 
rate of at-risk students is 65.5% (which are nearly double the 
rates of students in the same categories in Lubbock High 
School). The effect of de facto segregation becomes even more 
apparent when comparing Lubbock’s middles schools, which 
 
 71.  Slaton Middle School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org 
/districts/lubbock-isd/slaton-middle-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019). 
 72.  Smylie Wilson Middle School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, 
https://schools.texastribune.org/districts/lubbock-isd/smylie-wilson-middle-school/ (last visited 
February 23, 2019). 
 73.  About the Data, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org/about/#at-
risk (last visited February 23, 2019) (providing the Texas Education Agency’s definition of “at-
risk” students). 
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are located in smaller areas of the city. All of Lubbock’s middle 
schools (with the exception of Mackenzie Middle School) have 
disproportionate numbers of non-White and White students, 
and, subsequently, higher rates of economically disadvantaged 
and at-risk students. Therefore, higher rates of de facto segre-
gation between White and non-White students directly corre-
late with higher rates of “economically disadvantaged” and “at-
risk” students.74 
The damage done by racial segregation is further 
demonstrated by lower high school graduation rates and lower 
bachelor’s degree attainment among racial and ethnic minority 
students in Lubbock. The high school graduation rate is 9.31% 
lower for Black students than for white students, and 24.73% 
lower for Latino students than for White students.75 Further-
more, college bachelor-degree attainment rates for White stu-
dents are 40.11%, compared to only 11.45% for Black students 
and 11.93% for Latino students.76 While there are several fac-
tors that determine high school graduation rates and bachelor-
degree attainment for students, and causation is difficult to es-
tablish with certainty, the rates represented above can be inter-
preted as some evidence of the effect of racial and socio-
economic de facto segregation in schools.77  
 
 74.  See Lubbock Independent School District, PROPUBLICA, Miseducation (2017) 
https://projects.propublica.org/miseducation/district/4828500 (identifying LISD as a district 
with high rates of segregation, achievement disparity, discipline disparity, and opportunity dis-
parity between White and non-White students). 
 75.  Lubbock Population, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW (June 12, 2018), 
http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/lubbock/. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  See generally Richard Rothstein, For Public Schools, Segregation Then, Segrega-
tion Since: Education and the Unfinished March, ECON. POLICY INST., 5–15 (2013), 
http://www.epi.org/files/2013/Unfinished-March-School-Segregation.pdf; Aaron Williams, et 
al., America is more diverse than ever — but still segregated, THE WASH. POST (May 10, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/segregation-us-cities/?utm_ 
term=.f8da453776d1; Mario L. Barnes, et. al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 
967, 988–91 (2010). 
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With the case study of Lubbock’s history as an im-
portant contextual preface, the next section of this legal note 
analyzes  how race and the law have grown together and influ-
enced the judicial interpretation of racial issues in the United 
States. 
 
III.RACE AND THE LAW  
 
As the renowned historian Winthrop Jordan so elo-
quently stated: “It is now clear that mankind is a single biologi-
cal species; that races are neither discrete nor stable units but 
rather that they are plastic, changing, integral parts of a whole 
which is itself changing.”78 Thus, in a sense, race is not a scien-
tific truth based in biological evidence (despite past attempts by 
eugenicists to “prove” race).79 As one racial historian stated: 
 
“. . .race is not a scientific fact but a social, 
cultural, and ideological ‘construction’—a set of 
ideas—through which societies have sought to 
organize, structure, and understand them-
selves. . . . [S]ocieties have used ideas about race 
to reserve wealth and power for those members 
defined as ‘white’ and to deny those goods to 
members defined as ‘black’ and ‘brown.’”80 
 
Despite the fluctuating nature of  “race” as social con-
cept, throughout the history of the United States the Supreme 
 
 78.  WINTHROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN; HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF 
RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES, ix-xii (Oxford Univ. Press, 1974). 
 79.  Howard Markel, Column: The false, racist theory of eugenics once ruled science. 
Let’s never let that happen again, PBS (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/ 
column-the-false-racist-theory-of-eugenics-once-ruled-science-lets-never-let-that-happen-
again. 
 80.  GEORGE REID ANDREWS, AFRO-LATIN AMERICA, 1800-2000, 6 (Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1st ed. 2004). 
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Court has employed a “background rule” of race as a biological 
reality in its race-law jurisprudence.81 While the background 
rule has remained intact, the Court has added and modified 
various “foreground rules” to change its approach to race-law 
interpretation.82 The Court’s approach is best categorized as 
three phases of judicial interpretation: (1) Classic Liberal, (2) 
Modern Liberal (“Colorblind”), and (3) Neoliberal (“Post-
racial”).83  
A. Phase 1: Classic Liberal 
 
Race was established as a social, economic, political, and 
legal reality by imperialist European nations and their colonies, 
to justify the oppression and colonization of non-Europeans.84 
Thus, the biological construction of race was first developed by 
European nations and then imported to its colonies as an over-
arching social construct, or “background rule.”85 Furthermore, 
European colonies and their nations developed various local 
laws to reify the biological concept of race into their respective 
legal systems.86 Thus, the overarching background rule of race 
as a biological concept existed in the North American colonies 
for centuries before the advent of the United States under a 
unified constitution.87 
 
 81.  See Justin Desautels-Stein, Race as a Legal Concept, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 4, 
42 (2012). 
 82.   Id. at 5. (defining foreground rules as “those rules believed to be responsive to a 
pre-existing activity. . . [which] regulate, manage, and control”). 
 83.  Id. at 4-5. 
 84.  See MARTHA MENCHACA, RECOVERING HISTORY, CONSTRUCTING RACE: THE 
INDIAN, BLACK, AND WHITE ROOTS OF MEXICAN AMERICANS, 10–20 (Univ. of Tex. Press, 
2001); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE; THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY, 32 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1st ed. 
1994). 
 85.  Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 3 (citations omitted). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  See GEORGE REID ANDREWS, AFRO-LATIN AMERICA, 1800-2000, 6 (Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1st ed. 2004). 
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The construction of race-law during the United States’ 
first two centuries of existence was primarily a continuation of 
the overtly racist background rule imported from Europe.88 De-
spite the turmoil caused by legalized racism, which culminated 
in the Civil War, the Court continued its overtly racist ap-
proach to judicial interpretation by allowing a system of state 
laws to develop based on the “separate but equal” legal theory 
in Plessy v. Ferguson, until the mid-twentieth century.89 This 
period of judicial race-law interpretation is referred to as the 
“Classic Liberal” phase.90   
In the decades leading up to the Civil War, the nation 
faced challenges caused by rapid changes in the economic and 
social structure of the United States. A rapid influx of immigra-
tion and territorial expansion into what became the American 
Southwest forced the American electorate to face the question 
of slavery in the wake of the Compromise of 1850.91 It was dur-
ing this politically tumultuous time, in 1857, that the back-
ground rule of race as a biological construction was formally 
entrenched in the federal legal system by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.92 In its now infamous Dred Scott decision, the Court 
wrote “that neither the class of persons who had been imported 
as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free 
or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people” and 
“had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”93 
 
 88.  See generally Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 18-20. 
 89.  Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown: Understanding 
and Remedying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated Schools, 88 N.C. L. 
REV. 787, 834 (2010). 
 90.  Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 3. 
 91.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857), superseded by constitu-
tional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also Melvin I. Urofsky, Compromise of 
1850, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, (February 4, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/event/ 
Compromise-of-1850; Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 7. 
 92.  RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE; THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY, 32 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1st ed. 
1994). 
 93.  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407 (emphasis added). 
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Three years after Dred Scott, the nation broke out into 
the Civil War, leading to the end of slavery and the ratification 
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution. Despite these inroads, the biological back-
ground rule of race remained the foundation of race jurispru-
dence in the United States.94 Despite slavery being outlawed, 
Southern states immediately established a system of laws to 
continue its oppression of Blacks, which were quickly sanc-
tioned by the Court.95  
Just eighteen years after the end of the Civil War, in the 
Civil Rights Cases, and later in Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court 
began asserting “post-race-like principles,” as it “interpret[ed] 
the scope of the Reconstruction Amendments.”96 In fact, con-
stitutional legal experts have noted that while the Court could 
hardly discount the importance of race in the decades after the 
Civil War, “the language and the reasoning that the Court em-
ployed in its opinions to justify both racial segregation and the 
limited use of the law as an affirmative mechanism for change 
were decidedly post-racial in that the Court’s analysis denied 
the continuing significance of past racial oppression and the 
ongoing presence of racism.”97 Thus, the Court “attempted to 
negate the importance of race, alternatively finding it to be ei-
ther of no moment or a legitimate basis to segregate.”98  
 
B. The Modern Liberal “Colorblind” Phase 
 
The Modern Liberal phase is essential in understanding 
that the legal concept of race was not only reinforced by the 
 
 94.  Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 4. 
 95.  KLUGER, supra note 92, at 31-42. 
 96.  Mario L. Barnes, et. al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 969 
(2010). 
 97.  Id. at 969–70. 
 98.  Id. at 969. 
SMITH_MACROS.DOCM (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2019  12:18 PM 
1] Separating the Wheat from the Tares 
117 
 
Supreme Court’s use of race to justify harmful laws (e.g. 
Plessy), but also by its attempt to undo the damage of those 
laws (e.g. Brown).99 Thus, instead of eliminating the back-
ground rule of race as a biological reality, the Court added 
foreground rules to address the damage that was caused by ra-
cial categorization.100 Even the so-called “colorblind” approach 
by the Court jurists was rooted in the idea of race as a biologi-
cal concept.101 The difference was that the modern liberal ap-
proach was to establish foreground rules (e.g. the civil rights 
statutes established in the second half of the twentieth century) 
based on race in order to regulate the old background rules.  
Some researchers have identified “race” not as some-
thing built into a person’s DNA, but is instead a social categori-
zation.102 The Court identified racism as “prejudice against dis-
crete and insular minorities” and as a “special condition, which 
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political pro-
cesses ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and 
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.”103 Thus, by the Supreme Court’s use of “discrete,” 
“insular,” to reinforce the biological construct of race, the Su-
preme Court reified the  biological concept of race, which laid 
the foundation for the foreground rule of “strict scrutiny” de-
cidedly established in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.104 
The springboard of the Modern Liberal phase of judicial 
interpretation was Brown v. Board of Education, decided in 
 
 99.  Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 5-6. 
 100.  Id. at 5-6. 
 101.  Id. at 5-7. 
 102.  See WINTHROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN; HISTORICAL ORIGINS 
OF RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES, ix-xii (Oxford Univ. Press, 1974); GEORGE REID 
ANDREWS, AFRO-LATIN AMERICA, 1800-2000, 6 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1st ed. 2004). 
 103.  United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938) (emphasis add-
ed); See also Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 40-41. 
 104.  See Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 43; See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995). 
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1954.105 This case explicitly recognized the damage done by a 
system of separate public schools for children of White and 
Black children, and that this per se disadvantaged Black stu-
dents. Later, the Civil Rights Amendment of 1964 and the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965 solidified federal protections for Blacks, 
and the Court began enforcing desegregation efforts.106 
These civil protections, however, were not extended to 
Latino students until the Court’s decision in Keyes v. Denver 
School District decision in 1971.107 This delay in extending civil 
rights protections to Latinos was due to the complex history of 
Latinos attempting to “pass” as legally “White” for several dec-
ades, but being discriminated against as a “White” underclass 
nonetheless.108 Historian Brian Behnken describes this phe-
nomenon as follows: 
 
Mexican Americans throughout the twentieth 
century had done a great deal to convince Anglos 
that they were white. In many cases, Anglos re-
sisted. In the Chicano movement, Mexican 
Americans had to go to great lengths to convince 
whites of their brownness. Interestingly, Anglos 
resisted reclassifying Chicanos, preferring instead 
to categorize them as white so they could use 
them as integration’s ‘pawns, puppets, and scape-
goats.’ In the 1940s and 1950s whiteness had of-
fered Latinos the best chance for ending racism. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, brownness became the 
best hope for doing so.109  
 
 105.  See Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 4. 
 106.  See generally Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 40-41. 
 107.  See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 197 (1973). 
 108.  BEHNKEN, FIGHTING THEIR OWN BATTLES: MEXICAN AMERICANS, BLACKS, 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN TEXAS, 4 (2011). 
 109.  Id. at 206. 
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Thus, the school districts involved in Keyes in Denver attempt-
ed to comply with court-ordered desegregation by defining La-
tino students as “White” and putting all the Black and Latino 
students in the same schools, while leaving White students in 
their own schools.110 Thus, the Court utilized the same Modern 
Liberal (Colorblind) approach to Latinos. 
While the Court’s Modern Liberal (Colorblind) ap-
proach allowed the Court to identify and protect the constitu-
tional rights of racial minorities by adding foreground rules to 
judicial interpretation, the approach still relied upon the back-
ground rule of race as a biological reality. By retaining the 
background rule, the Court allowed the future argument to be 
undercut by post-racialist rhetoric.111   
 
C. Phase Three: Neoliberal Post-racialism 
 
In contrast to modern liberalism, neo liberalism is hos-
tile to the foreground rules of race.112 Neoliberal proponents 
are “notoriously hostile to the use of foreground rules, claiming 
that racial dynamics in the United States have progressed to the 
point where much of equal protection jurisprudence is actually 
fostering racial discrimination instead of remedying it. It is in 
this sense that this most recent phase is post-racial.113 Neoliber-
al proponents have also turned the principle of “colorblindness” 
on its head in the context of equal protection interpretation.114 
Because the Neoliberal ideology takes racial classifications to be 
 
 110.  Id. at 198. See also Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 197 
(1973). 
 111.  Mario L. Barnes, et. al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 972 
(2010). 
 112.  Justin Desautels-Stein, Race as a Legal Concept, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 5–6 
(2012). 
 113.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 114.  Id. 
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a biological reality instead of a man-made construct, “the post-
racial view of colorblindness makes the claim that because race 
is a natural, pre-political sphere of human identity, it is wrong 
for the state to make regulations on the basis of racial identi-
ty.”115  
Those who assert the myth of post-racialism essentially 
state that in society, “overt individual discrimination has 
waned” sufficiently so that judicial intervention is no longer 
necessary; yet, the reality is that “institutional and structural 
barriers still result in disparate life outcomes along racial 
lines.”116  The problem with post-racialism is that it ignores the 
continued issues caused by the United States’ racist past.117 It 
also perpetuates ignorance of current issues of racism by creat-
ing a “revised understanding of equality, one that will result in a 
significant change in constitutional race jurisprudence.”118  
Indeed, the very reactionary rhetoric used by the Su-
preme Court in the last three decades is similar to the language 
perpetuated by the Court during the Reconstruction Era in the 
decades after the Civil War—the time when overt legalized rac-
ism became entrenched in U.S. law apart from slavery.119 It is 
this Neoliberal myth of post-racialism that led to the demise of 
school desegregation litigation, and which has allowed the re-
surgence of de facto school segregation in urban centers.120 
There were two primary cases that relied on the myth of 
post-racialism and which marked  the end of court-mandated 
desegregation: Board of Education v. Dowell (1991) and Free-
 
 115.  Id. at 6. 
 116.  Barnes, supra note 111, at 972. 
 117.  Id. at 967–68. 
 118.  Id. at 969. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American 
Public Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597 (2003); Gary Orfield, Schools More 
Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation, (The Civil Rights Project: Harvard 
Univ., 2001) https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED459217.pdf. See Justin Desautels-Stein, Race 
As A Legal Concept, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L., 42–50 (2012). 
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man v. Pitts (1992). These two cases established three ambigu-
ous requirements before a school district could be relinquished 
from court-mandated segregation: (1) the school district must 
have complied with all aspects of the court’s desegregation or-
der; (2) the school district had to be able to maintain desegrega-
tion without additional judicial intervention; and (3) the school 
district had to prove to the previously disfavored race its “good 
faith” commitment that it had complied with the court deseg-
regation order.121 Ultimately, the desegregation came to an end 
with  Missouri v. Jenkins 1995.122 In that case, the U.S. Su-
preme Court struck down “desegregation attractiveness,” or 
magnet, programs, which had previously been an essential pre-
scription of court orders.123 Even worse was the court’s decision 
to reduce the standard of desegregation compliance from 
Green’s prescription of eliminating racial discrimination both 
“root and branch,” to merely requiring school districts to elim-
inate “the vestiges of past discrimination . . . to the extent prac-
ticable” demonstrated by a vague “good-faith commitment to 
the whole of the court’s decree and to those provisions of the 
law . . . that were the predicate for judicial intervention in the 
first instance.”124 
 
1. The Neoliberal myth of post-racialism has led to the demise 
of school segregation litigation despite continued discrimina-
tion  
 
The federal judiciary was not the only government 
branch to succumb to the myth of post-racialism. The 1964 
 
 121.  See Charles T. Clotfelter, Public School Segregation in Metropolitan Areas, 
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH (1998), http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w6779.pdf; Barnes, supra note 111, at 989. 
 122.  Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 150 (1995). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Board of Ed. of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249–250 
(1991). 
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Civil Rights Act is an important starting point in understanding 
how integration policy failed to meet the needs of people of 
color. The initial Civil Rights Act “required the Office of Edu-
cation to investigate school districts that failed to integrate.”125 
In order to prevent Southern members of Congress from strik-
ing the act down, the Johnson administration diluted this part 
of the policy. Instead, the plan was for the Office of Education 
to ask regional attorneys in highly segregated areas to report 
any instances of resistance to integration.126 
In 1964, the Office of Education commissioned a lead-
ing sociologist, James Coleman, to conduct the survey. Cole-
man analyzed—based on a 600,000 student sample survey127— 
student and family attitudes as well as their social and economic 
circumstances. The survey also included a math and reading 
test for the students. The result of the survey was that there was 
not a large correlation gap between resource disparities and ra-
cial achievement.128 Rather, economic disparity and the level of 
education of parents had a greater effect upon the success of 
students.129 As such, the survey found that the fact that Blacks 
were economically marginalized was the primary damaging fac-
tor in poor student success.130 Therefore, integration policies 
only benefited Black students if they were integrated into 
schools with middle class families. Thus, it became clear that in 
order to improve student achievement, both the racial and the 
socioeconomic situation of Blacks had to be addressed. 
 
 125.  Richard Rothstein, For Public Schools, Segregation Then, Segregation Since: Edu-
cation and the Unfinished March, ECON. POLICY INST., 3 (2013), http://www.epi.org/files/ 
2013/Unfinished-March-School-Segregation.pdf. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  See Charles T. Clotfelter, Public School Segregation in Metropolitan Areas, 
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH (1998), http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w6779.pdf. 
 129.  See id. 
 130.  See id. 
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Unfortunately, the Johnson Administration succumbed 
to political pressures and downplayed the Coleman report to 
ensure that they could move their agenda forward in the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act.131 As a result, instead of 
emphasizing economic and class integration of neighborhoods 
through federal subsidies, the Johnson Administration focused 
on putting money into fruitless efforts to improve central city 
neighborhoods. A similar failure occurred with the Nixon Ad-
ministration. Initially, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, led by George Romney, agreed to withhold 
funds from White suburbs who refused to subsidize lower-
middle-income and low-income public housing for Black fami-
lies.132 This policy, however, caused a rift in the Nixon Admin-
istration.133 The opponents to housing integration eventually 
won out on the argument that Nixon would lose too many con-
servative supporters.134 Nixon denounced federal interference in 
local housing authority disputes, and his selection of federal 
court judges essentially eradicated the last major push for eco-
nomic integration in bettering the lives of marginalized racial 
minorities.135 
Furthermore, in the early 1970s the National Assess-
ment of Educational Progress (NAEP) was established to pro-
vide an overall indication of how students were doing both in-
tellectually and emotionally.136 The assessment was very 
comprehensive at the outset, but with funding cuts it was re-
duced to a basic in-school written reading and math test.137 As 
 
 131.  Richard Rothstein, For Public Schools, Segregation Then, Segregation Since: Edu-
cation and the Unfinished March, ECON. POLICY INST., 4 (2013), http://www.epi.org/files/ 
2013/Unfinished-March-School-Segregation.pdf. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. at 5. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  See id. at 5. 
 137.  See id. at 5-6. 
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such, policy was overwhelmingly focused on the numbers that 
students produce, and was based on the premise that increasing 
school resources would boost test scores rather than addressing 
the actual needs of students.138 This misuse of benchmarks to 
achieve greater funding instead of helping students has contin-
ued to the present day, as many educational policy-makers and 
high-level administrators continue to use a backwards theory of 
cognitive development in creating educational policy.139 Many 
post-racialists argue that if children merely get the education 
that they need, then they will escape poverty.140 Thus, many 
educational reformers focus only upon improving school re-
sources and teachers, claiming that this alone will solve the 
problem of the student achievement gap and racial isolation.141 
This ignores the pattern of intergenerational poverty and the 
external economic climate.142 Former New York City Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg summarized the all too familiar post-racial 
argument of today when he said, “a lot of what Dr. King want-
ed to accomplish in our society will take care of itself” if schools 
improve.143 This echoes the apathy of post-racialists, who have 
allowed “racial fatigue”144 to blind—and sometimes willfully 
so—leaders who convince themselves and their constituents of 
the great post-racial myth: that “[r]acism is not the norm, and 
 
 138.  See id. at 17. 
 139.  See id.; See Mario L. Barnes, et. al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 
967, 980-992 (2010). 
 140.  See Barnes, supra note 139. 
 141.  See MARGUERITE L. SPENCER, ET AL, THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION IN OUR EDUCATION SYSTEM: WHY THIS MATTERS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY, 
9-11 (Kirwan Inst. for the Study of Race and Ethnicity: Ohio State Univ. 2009); Barnes, supra 
note 139. 
 142.  See Richard Kahlenberg, The Return of Separate but Equal, in INEQUALITY 
MATTERS: THE GROWING ECONOMIC DIVIDE IN AMERICA AND ITS POISONOUS 
CONSEQUENCES, 55-64 (James Lardner & David A. Smith eds., 2005). 
 143.  Richard Rothstein, For Public Schools, Segregation Then, Segregation Since: Edu-
cation and the Unfinished March, ECON. POLICY INST., 16 (2013), http://www.epi.org/files/ 
2013/Unfinished-March-School-Segregation.pdf. 
 144.  Barnes, supra note 139, at 976, 979. 
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that which remains is limited to the random, isolated acts of 
bigots.”145 This is not so. 
While the United States, as a whole, has become more 
racially integrated since 1990, many of the nation’s major urban 
areas have experienced an increase in de facto residential, and 
subsequently school segregation. In fact, in large metropolitan 
areas, minority students are often more concentrated in schools 
with peers of the same race than they were during the active in-
tegration movement of the 1970’s.146 Researcher Richard Roth-
stein points to economic disparity between White and racial 
minority families as the primary culprit for concentrations of 
minorities in low-income neighborhoods, and subsequently in 
the schools to which those neighborhoods are assigned.147  
Moreover, as education funding is often tied to the local 
tax base of the families within school districts, and Latino and 
Black students are disproportionately concentrated in neigh-
borhoods with lower incomes, these students attend schools 
that are increasingly segregated in the sense that they consist-
ently have less educational funds.148 To make matters more 
complicated, the Court refuses to recognize education as a fun-
damental right, and only reviews claims of discrimination based 
on socioeconomic status under the lower standard of “rational 
basis” review.149 Thus, many Latino and Black families become 
trapped in the vicious cycle of intergenerational poverty, lower 
high school and college graduation rates, and lower rates of in-
come accumulation.150 
 
 145.  Barnes, supra note 139, at 998. 
 146.  Rothstein, supra note 143, at 13; See also Aaron Williams, et al., America is more 
diverse than ever — but still segregated, THE WASH. POST (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/segregation-uscities/?utm_term=. 
2f43738ba56f. 
 147.  Rothstein, supra note 143, at 16-17. 
 148.  Barnes, supra note 139, at 989. See generally Kahlenberg, supra note 135. 
 149.  Barnes, supra note 139, at 993-94 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1972)). 
 150.  Barnes, supra note 139, at 989 (citations omitted). 
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Effective education today cannot come from meeting 
the bare minimum requirements and only teaching students the 
state-sanctioned curriculum to meet a threshold for test scores. 
Rather, students need material that they can connect with. For 
some students, this most effectively comes through bilingual or 
dual immersion programs. For others, they desire material that 
applies to their specific culture that is so often minimized in the 
White-centric literature that is most commonly used in primary 
and secondary education. Professor Emdin recently discussed 
the importance of teaching to the needs of students.151 He dis-
cussed education and equity, asserting that equity is not 
achieved merely by providing students with what administrators 
and state school board members recommend.152 Instead, equi-
table education involves counseling with parents and teachers in 
order to give students the educational experience that they truly 
need to be successful.153  
Residential and school segregation continue to hinder 
United States social and economic progress.154 As will be dis-
cussed in the next section, the law will continue to be an inef-
fective remedy to prevent individual discrimination in the 
United States until the Court allows local schools to remedy 
the effects of past race-based discrimination. 
 
2. Parents Involved: The Epitome of Neoliberal Post-racialism 
 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle pro-
vides the quintessential example of  Neoliberal post-racial rhet-
oric in the twenty-first century: “Writing for the majority, 
 
 151.  Reality Pedagogy: Christopher Emdin at TEDx Teachers College, YOUTUBE (Aug 
23, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Y9tVf_8fqo (accessed September 3, 2018). 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  See MARGUERITE L. SPENCER, ET AL, THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION IN OUR EDUCATION SYSTEM: WHY THIS MATTERS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY, 
4-11 (Kirwan Inst. for the Study of Race and Ethnicity: Ohio State Univ. 2009). 
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Chief Justice Roberts repeated the constitutional mantra: 
whenever a public actor administers a racial classification, it will 
be viewed with strict scrutiny. . .”155 Strict scrutiny is the high-
est standard in civil litigation and cases only survive constitu-
tional review “when it serves a strong social need and it has 
been articulated in the narrowest of ways.”156 Thus, even 
though the Seattle school districts were seeking to promote ra-
cial integration, diversity, and provide more opportunities for 
students of each racial background to benefit from shared expe-
riences, the Court struck the school district’s remedial integra-
tion plan down because it was not “narrowly” tailored.157  
The Court’s majority opinion in Parents Involved is an 
instructive example of how the Supreme Court continues to 
hide behind pretended neutrality by taking a hard “colorblind” 
approach—even to important state and local programs which 
remedy the damage of past legalized racism. Chief Justice Rob-
erts’ statement is the quintessential post-racial argument of 
“false universalism,” which asserts that every person is born on 
equal ground and “requires no state-provided advantage.”158 
This allows the Court to avoid remedying past damage in the 
name of interpreting the “original” intention of the Constitu-
tion to limit the judiciary’s powers. But, as has already been dis-
cussed at length in this paper, the original intention of the 
Constitution and the power granted to the judicial branch was 
distorted by the background rule employed in the Dred Scott 
decisions.159 
 
 155.  Justin Desautels-Stein, Race as a Legal Concept, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 46 
(2012). 
 156.  Id. at 47. 
 157.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 726 
(2007). 
 158.  Mario L. Barnes, et. al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 972 
(2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 159.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857), superseded by constitu-
tional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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To continue to take a hard “colorblind” approach to 
remedial programs in the context of false universalism is a poor 
justification for avoiding judicial remedies in promoting civil 
rights. In fact, the Court contradicts itself: while the Court 
purports to hold fast to “colorblind” decisions, the court never 
once questioned the concept of race itself.160 Instead, the Court 
held on to the fundamental background rule that has existed 
since the nation’s founding: that race is a biological reality. 
If the Court had truly relied upon a “race-neutral” deci-
sion, the Court should not have merely relied upon its Grutter 
decision and continued the façade of “colorblindness.”161 This is 
especially true as Grutter dealt with a public institution of 
higher education (and a selective law school at that), whereas 
Parents Involved dealt with public primary and secondary 
schools. Furthermore, Professor Desautels-Stein explains how 
questions, which are essential in utilizing true race-neutral judi-
cial interpretation, were never addressed by the Court in Grut-
ter: “[i]f the law school had decided to challenge [the claim-
ant’s] standing” and “argue that she had not been injured by the 
policy because she had failed to prove she was ‘White,’ what 
forms of proof would have satisfied the Court? ‘Cultural per-
formance’? As long as these sorts of standing questions are left 
in abeyance, decisions like Grutter and Parents Involved are 
able to proceed.”162 Desautels-Stein further notes the “dramatic 
shift in the jurisprudence away from a focus on racism and to-
wards a focus on ethnic or cultural diversity” that “was picked 
up and hammered home in Grutter and Parents Involved.”163 
This shift in race jurisprudence has caused a difficult problem 
“where we still have urgent needs in repairing the social effects 
of neo-racism,” but “courts have taught themselves to gaze 
 
 160.  See Desautels-Stein, supra note 155, at 48-49. 
 161.  See Desautels-Stein, supra note 155, at 48. 
 162.  Id. at 44. 
 163.  Id. at 53-54. 
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elsewhere: into the hazy shade of a diverse and politically safe 
multicultural landscape.”164 Consequently, the Court’s shift 
from acknowledging race at all does not function to address 
contemporary racism; rather, it ignores reality and deflects the 
court’s attention from addressing discrimination in the United 
States today.165 Thus, “the jurist needs to understand how calls 
for racial diversity have persistently obscured calls for racial jus-
tice.”166 
Instead of following the conflicted opinion expressed in 
Grutter, the Court in Parents Involved could have utilized a ca-
veat like that expressed by the district court in Ortiz v. Bank of 
America:  
 
I begin with the fact most widely agreed upon by 
modern biologists, anthropologists, and other 
students of human diversity. The notion of race 
is a taxonomic device and, as with all such con-
structs, it exists in the human mind not as a divi-
sion in the objective universe.167 
 
Thus, if the Court in Parents Involved had undertaken true 
race-neutral judicial interpretation, the Court would have chal-
lenged the very concept of race to be defined by local school 
district. Even more disturbing than the majority’s determina-
tion to hold onto a false sense of constitutional originalism is 
Chief Justice Robert’s criticism of the notion that racial diversi-
ty and integration actually have benefits. In spite of the fact that 
there exist many benefits of diversity in education,168 Roberts 
 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. at 49 (quoting Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 F. Supp. 550, 565, (E. D. Cal. 
1982)).  
 168.  See generally, Daryl G. Smith & Natalie B. Schonfeld, The Benefits of Diversity: 
What the Research Tells Us, 5 ABOUT CAMPUS, no. 5, 16 (2000). 
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glosses over the amicus briefs supporting such diversity 
measures.169 In sum, Professor Desautels-Stein explains the 
Court’s neoliberal approach expressed in Parents Involved as 
follows:  
 
Though Roberts hardly is explicit about the ra-
cial question (as very few court decisions are), 
the Parents analytical framework clearly pre-
sumes that the kind of thinking about race 
in Ortiz was wrong-headed. School boards in Se-
attle and Louisville sought to better integrate 
certain high schools, presumably on the belief 
that there is something valuable about the idea of 
racially integrated schools. That value might con-
sist in all sorts of things, ranging from anti-racist 
attacks on the Racial Contract, to utilitarian ar-
guments in favor of everyone being better off 
when more kinds of people are in contact with 
one another, to the desires to do justice with re-
gard to a social system that systematically privi-
leges certain people at the expense of others, to 
the desire of more powerful actors to neutralize 
potential threats through the use of relatively be-
nign political strategies. Whatever value might 
have been in the minds of the regulators, howev-
er, Roberts very clearly believed that “racial bal-
ance” had nothing to do with power and domina-
tion, but was instead a question about the 
 
 169.  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 731–
32 (2007). With regard to the benefits of diversity, see generally Christine Chambers Good-
man, A Modest Proposal in Deference to Diversity, 23 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 5 (2010); Gary 
Orfield, Schools More Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation, (The Civil 
Rights Project: Harvard Univ., 2001) https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED459217.pdf. 
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allocation of seats based on ancestry and heredi-
ty.170 
 
Researchers have demonstrated that between 1996-
2006, rates doubled of nearly all-minority schools (defined as 
less than 5% of students as White), and that, on average, White 
students attended schools in which 77% of the population was 
White.171 Furthermore, between 2005-2006, approximately 
two-thirds of minority-majority schools were in areas with 
“very high levels of segregation.”172 Thus, minority students be-
come “trap[ped] in an inescapable, generational cycle” of “ra-
cialized poverty,” which “decreases life opportunities . . . limits 
educational attainment, constrains future earning potential, and 
negatively impacts health and safety.”173  In contrast, decades of 
scholarship has established that “racially and economically inte-
grated education can promote individual lifelong success, stabi-
lize communities, and secure the economic viability of the na-
tion.”174  
Despite these very real barriers for impoverished minor-
ity students, the Court concluded that “remedying past societal 
discrimination does not justify race-conscious government ac-
tion.”175 In other words, the Court does not consider remedying 
the effects of societal discrimination as its responsibility; and 
yet the Court has not provided a viable avenue for state or fed-
eral legislatures to allow for programs to remedy the continued 
 
 170.  Desautels-Stein, supra note 155, at 49. 
 171.  See MARGUERITE L. SPENCER, ET AL, THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION IN OUR EDUCATION SYSTEM: WHY THIS MATTERS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY, 
4-5 (Kirwan Inst. for the Study of Race and Ethnicity: Ohio State Univ. 2009). 
 172.  See id. at 4. 
 173.  Id. at 1. 
 174.  See id. at 4. 
 175.  See e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
731 (2007). 
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social and economic issues caused by past legalized racism.176 
So, what can be done? 
 
IV.WHAT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION RESEARCH TELLS US 
 
Despite all of its flaws, Parents Involved does lay “prom-
ising legal groundwork for addressing racial isolation across and 
within opportunity structures, including housing, public health, 
economic development and transportation.”177 Attempts by uni-
versities to implement affirmative action have produced the 
most extensive research and analysis regarding the benefits of 
diversity in education. Some of the primary educational benefits 
of diversity include: “a positive impact on attitudes toward ra-
cial issues, . . .enhance[d] cognitive development, and . . . [an 
increase in] overall satisfaction and involvement by students 
with their educational institution.”178 Furthermore, students 
who engage in a more diverse educational environment experi-
ence “increased commitment to civic engagement, democratic 
outcomes, community participation during and after college,” 
and increases the likelihood of students “living in less segregat-
ed communities after college.”179  
Despite its demonstrated benefits, affirmative action has 
been an increasingly controversial topic of discussion for the 
last two decades since William Bowen and Derek Bok pub-
lished their book The Shape of the River.180 While affirmative 
action has often been celebrated for its alleged benefit of in-
creasing diversity in higher education institutions, in 2004 Pro-
 
 176.  See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701 (2007). 
 177.  SPENCER, supra note 162, at 2. 
 178.  Daryl G. Smith & Natalie B. Schonfeld, The Benefits of Diversity: What the Re-
search Tells Us, 5 ABOUT CAMPUS, no. 5, 19 (2000). 
 179.  Id. at 19-20. 
 180.  Elizabeth Anderson, From Normative to Empirical Sociology in the Affirmative 
Action Debate: Bowen and Bok’s “the Shape of the River,” 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 284 (2000). 
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fessor Richard Sander, a legal scholar and economist, published 
an infamous criticism of affirmative action and the allegedly 
negative effect of affirmative action on black law students.181 In 
fact, Sander asserted that he had conclusive evidence negative 
impact on the numbers of qualified Black law students and 
Black attorneys.182 Sander’s statistical methodologies and subse-
quent conclusions, however, were later deemed to be flawed.183 
Part of this statistical analysis problem was exacerbated by his 
paper being published in a law review, which is a publication 
forum in which papers are edited by students instead of under-
going the same rigorous, peer-reviewed evaluation that aca-
demic journals undergo in other fields. Despite the many flaws 
of Sander’s work, his paper has forced the academic community 
to take a hard look at the use of affirmative action policies, 
which has led to important information about the continued 
value of these policies in the process of universities attracting 
diverse student bodies.184  
It is important to note that while affirmative action can 
help promote diversity, “[i]f all we do over the [next] twenty-
five years is affirmative action, then we will still need affirma-
tive action.”185 In other words, the current state of affirmative 
action policies will never be sufficient to achieve a fully equal 
United States, due to its limited focus on education and em-
ployment. However, in spite of such weaknesses, affirmative ac-
tion policies appear to be one of the only legal options left in 
 
 181.  See Michele Landis Dauber, The Big Muddy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1903 (2005); 
See Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black Law-
yers?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1809 (2005). 
 182.  See Dauber, supra note 181; See Ayres & Brooks, supra note 181. 
 183.  See Dauber, supra note 181; See Ayres & Brooks, supra note 181. 
 184.  See Ayres & Brooks, supra note 181; David L. Chambers et. al., The Real Impact of 
Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard 
Sander’s Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855, 1857 (2005). 
 185.  Kevin R. Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative Action?, 21 CONST. 
COMMENT. 171, 188, n.82 (2004) (quoting Nat Hentoff, Sandra Day O’Connor’s Elitist Deci-
sion, VILLAGE VOICE (July 29, 2003), at 30 (quoting Lisa Naverette)). 
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this era of neoliberal strict scrutiny of race-based remedial pro-
grams, thus suggesting the need to improve our current affirm-
ative action policies.  
Improving affirmative action will require new perspec-
tives about the purpose of remedial programs (created to in-
crease the academic success of racial minorities) and about new 
approaches to diversity. “At a bare minimum, the crisis in the 
public schools must be addressed before true integration of col-
leges and universities is a possibility.”186 This “crisis” in public 
schools seems especially concerning regarding the correlation 
between socioeconomic status and race.187  
One compelling approach to improving affirmative ac-
tion policies to promote diversity is that of Christine Good-
man’s “True Diversity Experience” based on: Access, Environ-
ment, and Self-Interest.188 Goodman defines these three 
elements as follows: 
 
[S]chools at each level will provide greater 
Access, and more consistently at-
tract diverse students and students who appreci-
ate and value diversity. Participating schools will 
also learn how to retain more of 
their diverse students, as they create and foster an 
Environment conducive to maintain-
ing diversity. The participating schools will be 
motivated to succeed in this experiment through 
their own Self-Interest, which will include 
providing access and opportunities for un-
 
 186.  Id. at 188. 
 187.  MARGUERITE L. SPENCER, ET AL, THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION IN OUR EDUCATION SYSTEM: WHY THIS MATTERS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY, 
6-9 (Kirwan Inst. for the Study of Race and Ethnicity: Ohio State Univ. 2009). 
 188.  Christine Chambers Goodman, A Modest Proposal in Deference to Diversity, 23 
NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 69 (2010). 
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derrepresented groups, cultivating 
a diverse learning environment, and increasing 
their attractiveness to the kinds 
of diverse students that they want to enroll.189 
 
This push for a more holistic approach to diversity is 
supported by other research regarding the need for “true” inte-
gration, as one researcher found that “simple desegregation ef-
forts often fail” and instead result in “assimilation, segregation 
within schools, ability grouping and tracking.”190 Instead, com-
prehensive racial and socioeconomic approaches to integration 
and diversity will give American “students the knowledge and 
skills necessary to become full members of our democratic soci-
ety, and to strengthen and legitimize our democracy.”191 Ulti-
mately, a move toward diversity is a move toward a more dem-
ocratic society. 
 
V. CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD 
 
Like a sliver embedded deep in a person’s skin with lay-
ers of skin having grown over the top, race has been embedded 
in American Jurisprudence since the Dred Scott decision. Alt-
hough it may be tempting to try to simply pluck out race (the 
sliver) from the law (the skin), this is impossible to do at this 
point in our history, as layers of law have grown around the 
foreign object of race (e.g. the Supreme Court’s Parents In-
volved decision). And just as an  embedded sliver causes a lin-
gering pain in the flesh, the ongoing spectre of race (with all 
the attendant individual and collective pain it has caused) must 
prompt the Court to continue to consciously consider race in 
 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  SPENCER, supra note 187, at 2. 
 191.  Id. at 3. 
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its decisions if educational institutions are to fix the damage 
caused by the past two and a half centuries of legalized racism 
in the U.S. I believe much of this damage can be remedied by 
focusing efforts on racial and socioeconomic “true” integration 
efforts, through the use of the “True Diversity Experience” 
proposed by Christine Goodwin.192  
It appears that the current state of American law is like 
that of the biblical parable of the wheat and the tares.193 The 
work of our collective “enemy” of the highest ideals of Ameri-
can democracy—the effect of past bigoted jurisprudence—has 
sown the “tares” of racism in the laws of the United States.194 
Those Supreme Court justices who supported Chief Justice 
Roberts’ opinion in Parents Involved appear to be making the 
argument of the servants in the parable: “The servants said un-
to him, Wilt thou then that we go and gather [the tares] up?”195 
Chief Justice Roberts’ decision reflects a narrow reading of past 
precedent that prematurely “roots up” both the “tares” (the use 
of race in the law) as well as the “wheat” (the goal of race-
neutral school policies). While it is noble for the Court to seek 
to end of the use of race in education at all, that is separation 
must come at a time when there is no longer a need for race-
based remedial measures under the law—when the proverbial 
“harvest” comes and the “tares” of race-based policies can be 
properly separated from the “wheat” of race-neutral school pol-
icies, due to greater equality in public education.196 
 
 192.  Goodman, supra note 188, at 69. 
 193.  Matthew 13:24-30 (King James). 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Matthew 13:28 (King James). 
 196.  See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American 
Public Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597 (2003); Gary Orfield, Schools More 
Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation, (The Civil Rights Project: Harvard 
Univ., 2001) https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED459217.pdf. See Justin Desautels-Stein, Race 
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Bigotry is an enemy to American democracy, for it 
blinds the minds of those who have a duty to protect our na-
tion’s most cherished ideals: “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness.”197 While we as a nation are not accountable for the 
sins of our ancestors, we are responsible to correct the legacy 
those sins have left us – a legacy that is still alive and well in the 
form of past de jure segregation, and continued de jure segrega-
tion in the present. As American law is iterative, and is there-
fore built on layers of precedent, the jurists of today have a duty 
to promote our democracy by, first, healing the damage done 
by past jurists’ abuse of the law; and, second, restoring the in-
tegrity of American law as the backbone of American democra-
cy. 
As I have demonstrated in this article, race and the law 
have grown together in a complex knot throughout the history 
of the United States. This knot will only be disentangled when 
jurists admit that the damage caused by past centuries of racist 
laws continues to exist, and when so-called “colorblind” neolib-
eral jurisprudence no longer ties the hands of any legislative 
and local political leaders from instituting policies which effec-
tively remedy past discrimination.198 The Supreme Court 
should not now wash its hands of legal precedent by claiming 
that race must be ignored in developing solutions to this prob-
lem, as significant legal damage was caused by judges function-
ing in legally racist paradigms for centuries.199 As one scholar 
put it, it is “unconscionable to imagine our equal protection 
doctrine as ultimately having no power to cure the lingering ef-
fects of this nation’s horribly racist past.”200  
 
Ethnicity: Ohio State Univ. 2009). 
 197.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 198.  See generally Mario L. Barnes, et. al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 
967, 980-91 (2010). 
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(2012). 
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To effectively address the damage done to the law and 
by the law—especially in America’s education system—jurists 
and lawmakers must recognize race, not as a biological fact, but 
as a social and legal construct that continues to negatively im-
pact racial and ethnic minorities in the United States. By utiliz-
ing this interpretive frame, the Court can assist national and lo-
cal leaders to remedy the effects of race-based discrimination. 
Improvement might include benchmarks set by non-partisan 
organizations that rely one reliable statistical data, to determine 
which measurements are vital in determining whether “improv-
ing life circumstances–matches our aspirations” in rectifying 
the disparate impact of race-based policies.201  
Until the time that we as a society achieve “true” diver-
sity and integration,202 our leaders, as well as the American elec-
torate, should talk of racial progress as an aspiration, and not as 
a past goal that we long ago achieved. In the words of Justice 
Blackmun: “In order to get beyond racism, we must first take 
account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat 
some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We can-
not—we dare not—let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate 
racial supremacy.”203  
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